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REPRESENTING THE POOR AND HOMELESS: 
A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH 
ROBERT A. SOLOMON* 
Several years ago, at a conference on representing the homeless, advocates 
were discussing developing suitable housing for single homeless people.  
Several people argued against single room occupancy (SRO) units without 
bathrooms and cooking facilities.  The question was posed as one of human 
dignity; our clients should not be subjected to the lowest possible form of 
housing.  I was fully persuaded by the argument, but for one problem.  In New 
Haven, Connecticut, in seeking to redevelop Connecticut’s largest SRO, we 
had interviewed 150 of the 218 occupants.  Our clients, a large majority, told 
us that they did not want bathrooms or, to a lesser extent, cooking facilities in 
their rooms.  When I mentioned this, an advocate from Wisconsin stated that 
his program had had the same experience. 
It is possible that our results were flawed or that we did not go far enough.  
Shared bathroom and cooking facilities may be the only available sites for 
social interaction in a building.  Further questioning may have resulted in a 
preference for individual bathrooms and alternative meeting rooms.  Or, it may 
be that our clients felt the added responsibility of cleaning a private bathroom 
or kitchen was not worth the added benefits.  Not being a resident of the SRO 
in question, I am not competent to answer the question.  Any answer I give is 
based on my own life and my own preferences.  Because most of us have 
always lived in residences with bathrooms and kitchens, we assume that 
everyone wants the same, and yet not everyone does. 
The second story is from a different perspective.  We represented the 
tenants of a severely blighted housing project containing 1,063 units.  The site 
was pretty depressing, with a vista of cracked and broken concrete between 
buildings, with no grass or trees.  We had filed suit concerning the conditions 
at the project.  At a tenants’ meeting, we asked the tenants to list their 
demands.  When the tenants asked what kinds of demands they could make, I 
suggested that they make a wish list, with anything they could think of to 
improve the project.  Then, as an afterthought, I added, “for example, how 
about some grass?  You could ask that they rip up some of this concrete and 
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have a nice grassy area.”  The result was immediate and dramatic.  People 
literally left their seats, slapped their heads and made comments to the effect of 
“Oh, no, anything but that. Anything but more grass.” 
It was quite clear that the tenants and I viewed grass from a very different 
perspective.  They had experienced grass as an abandoned lot, filled with 
weeds, broken glass, tires and other junk.  They viewed the concrete as an 
improvement, for which they had fought.  Based on my suburban childhood, 
when I thought of grass, I saw an attractive, well-tended place to play, much 
more suitable than the existing concrete. 
I do not suggest that the inquiry ends at accepting the tenants’ definition of 
“grass.”  We all knew that there were places where grassy areas were 
maintained and might be preferable to concrete.  The tenants, however, did not 
believe that the local housing authority would maintain the grass at this 
particular project. This is not an uncommon view in low-income 
neighborhoods, where green space is often seen as attracting crime, drugs, and 
dumping.  In order to change this perception, we would need to provide a more 
positive experience.  We might suggest ways to ensure adequate maintenance.  
The decision, however, is for the clients.  Our duty as lawyers is to give the 
clients a full menu of choices, so that they can make an educated decision.  An 
assumption that grass will be mowed is useful only if we are willing to do the 
mowing or are somehow confident that someone else will. 
That brings me to my third example.  A local community development 
corporation had funds to complete three neighborhood projects.  The members 
of the CDC were particularly concerned with the physical state of their 
neighborhood school.  The local board of education had announced an 
ambitious building project, which did not include this particular school.  As a 
result, the CDC decided to use its own funds for school improvement.  That is 
when things started to get confusing. 
The Yale School of Architecture has a “First Year Building Project.”  The 
project is a wonderful example of clinical education, which teaches through 
experiential learning while providing a substantial community benefit.  Prior to 
the fall term, the faculty identifies a project, with the caveat that the project 
must be fully funded, with a design and construction within the capabilities of 
architecture students.  Over the past twenty five years, projects have included a 
two family house for a local non-profit, a bandstand for the New Haven Green, 
and a host of others.  The architecture students, working in teams, spend the 
fall semester in a design competition.  Students spend the spring semester and 
the summer constructing the winning design.  The client pays for materials and 
expertise beyond that of the students (plumbers, electricians, etc.), but receives 
over $100,000 in free services.  The school project seemed perfect for the 
School of Architecture’s First Year Building Project. 
In order to make a presentation to the Superintendent of Schools, faculty 
and students began preliminary drawings for a 2000 square foot addition to the 
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school.  At a meeting with the Superintendent attended by school officials, 
CDC officers, architecture and law school faculty, and students, everyone 
“agreed” that the space would be used for a Head Start classroom, a second 
classroom, a parent resource room, and an office for the CDC.  However, as 
time went by, the school principal and the Superintendent expressed doubts as 
to the value of this added space.  CDC members began questioning whether the 
result was worth the expense.  Discontent seemed to be boiling below the 
surface.  Finally, the real problem surfaced. 
The Building Project had carefully set forth its own capability and 
requirements.  For pedagogic reasons, the architecture faculty did not believe 
the Building Project could design and develop a structure substantially larger 
than 2,000 square feet.  The CDC, focusing on the savings offered by the 
Building Project, saw the First Year Building Project as its only option.  Thus, 
the CDC saw itself as having a choice of the 2,000 square foot building or 
nothing.  No one had told the CDC that it could build something else if it was 
willing to forego the savings. 
When presented with that option, the CDC went back to the starting point 
to consider all of its options, beginning with asking the principal and teachers 
what they wanted.  The response was immediate and definitive: the teachers 
wanted a room big enough to hold all the children at one time, to serve as a 
gymnasium/cafeteria/assembly.  That required a minimum of 4,000 square 
feet.  The CDC decided to spend the additional funds.  Ironically, the School of 
Architecture was still able to participate in a different manner and bring about 
substantial savings.  In the end, the issue had noting to do with the cost and 
everything to do with a client who was not shown the entire menu.  Although 
the client grumbled at the cost of a hamburger, the client was delighted to pay 
for a lobster once that choice was made available. 
One more story.  In August 1999, I was appointed the Acting Executive 
Director of the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven.  The Housing 
Authority owns several high rise buildings, which are generally referred to as 
“elderly housing,” although, in reality, the tenants are a mix of elderly and 
disabled people.  Most of the units are efficiency apartments with bathrooms.  
When I go to tenant meetings at these buildings, the most vocal tenants are 
elderly and their most common complaint is a lack of security, for which they 
blame the younger residents.  Elderly residents complain that younger residents 
have more guests, are rowdier, make more noise, and stay up later at night.  
The guests, the complaint goes, are disruptive, are likely to stay for long 
periods of time (months, sometimes), sell drugs, and steal from other tenants.  
Since HUD now permits housing authorities to designate “elderly only” 
buildings, we could respond to the elderly constituency by complying with 
their request by designating certain buildings. 
There is, however, another side of this story.  I recently testified at a 
hearing of the local Commission on Disabilities, which wanted to know the 
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effect of “elderly only” buildings on the disabled.  One effect would be a 
reduction in the number of efficiency apartments available for disabled people, 
many of whom are single men who would likely be homeless but for the 
existence of those units. 
If our goal was to house the homeless, we would not designate any 
buildings as elderly.  In fact, this would be a wise marketing decision, since we 
have a long waiting list for single people under the age of 50, but virtually no 
waiting list for the elderly.  The question is “who is our clientele?”  If we want 
to meet the needs of the elderly poor, we would use our modernization funds to 
convert efficiencies to one bedroom apartments, which would meet a market 
preference.  At a cost of $30,000 - $40,000 per unit, this would cost millions of 
dollars.  If we market to homeless single people, we would not have to convert 
the efficiencies, although management would be more difficult and more 
costly.  While it is easy to conclude we should do both, we are talking about 
allocating scarce resources, both in the form of the existing units and in the 
form of our available capital.  Nor are the elderly and the disabled the only 
groups competing for these resources.  If we improve units for the elderly we 
will be foreclosed from spending the same funds to improve (or even maintain) 
family units. 
I offer these stories to raise three points: (1) While it is easy to define a 
client group broadly, e.g. “the homeless,” broad definitions are usually 
meaningless once we ask “who is the client” and “what does the client want?”  
Since the group known as “the homeless” consists of individuals and 
subgroups with competing interests, we need a more sophisticated analysis of 
who it is we are representing; (2) The unintended consequences of any social 
policy usually exceeds the intended consequences.  If you squeeze the balloon 
in one place, it will expand somewhere else.  If we were physicists, we might 
recognize more quickly that the laws of motion apply to social policy as well 
as the physical world and that for each action there is a corresponding and 
equal reaction.  Most housing markets are relatively static.  Subsidizing one 
group is often at the expense of another; (3) People with particularized 
problems have particularized needs.  As Bob Hayes said many years ago, for 
some homeless people, the answer is “homes, homes, homes.”1  As Robert 
Ellickson noted in response to Hayes, other people require special services 
including, mental health, day care, medical, substance abuse, and other 
services.2 
When we talk about solving the problems of the homeless, we include 
collateral problems. Supportive housing often recognizes the need for 
flexibility and movement in living arrangements, from a totally structured SRO 
 
 1. For discussion of the supply side argument, see S. Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and 
Social Policy.  45 MIAMI L. REV. 387, 398-404 (1990-91). 
 2. R. Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PUBLIC INTEREST 45 (Spring 1990). 
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and communal kitchen environment to more independent living.  Even within 
supportive housing, however, mental illness, mental retardation, AIDS, 
physical frailty, substance abuse and accessability all present different 
problems for individuals.  Each of these problems is indicative of a different 
subgroup of the homeless population.  Each subgroup has a stake in pushing its 
own agenda, often at the expense of other subgroups.  We are talking, after all, 
not only about the expenditure of limited resources, but about a pot that is 
inadequate by any standards. 
Years ago, I was mystified by the intensity of two legal services attorneys 
debating whether homelessness was an “entitlements problem” or a “housing 
problem.”  I asked a friend about the debate and he looked at me like I was 
from another planet.  The real debate, he explained, was about which 
department would control funds for providing legal services to the homeless.  
Since the entitlements and housing units provided different services, often to 
different populations, this was not an academic question.  Whoever won the 
argument and controlled the funds would get to answer two critical questions: 
(1) who are the homeless and (2) what are their legal needs. 
All of this is complicated (or made easier) by the locations and ways in 
which we meet our clients.  Sometimes we stumble into decisions which have 
serious ramifications for our clients.  When the Yale Law School clinic started 
an HIV project, we negotiated with a local HIV medical clinic to offer free 
legal services at their offices.  We thought this would be an ideal setting in 
which to make our services available.  It did not take long, however, before a 
colleague who worked on HIV issues on both a local and national level asked 
why we had chosen to represent a white, middle-classed clientele instead of a 
minority, low-income clientele.  The short answer to the question is that we did 
not know we were making that choice.  In arranging to see clients at a well-
known hospital location, we incorrectly assumed that we would see a cross-
section of the client population.  Our colleague’s description was all too 
accurate, as the medical clinic’s patients were largely people whose treatment 
was covered by medical insurance.  Other organizations in our community 
served uninsured or underinsured populations.  As in many communities, in 
New Haven this broke down along race and income lines. 
While our choice had particularly dramatic consequences, almost any 
intake site or delivery system has the potential to predetermine case selection.  
When we did outreach at New Haven’s first homeless shelter, we saw single 
men.  When Connecticut instituted a “welfare motel” system for homeless 
families during the late 1980s, we did outreach at the motels, where we saw 
single-parent families, almost exclusively headed by women.  Telephone 
intake requires access to a telephone (and, these days, the ability to negotiate 
an automated system); central office locations require transportation and often 
exclude the elderly and the disabled; neighborhood offices may, for all 
practical purposes, be limited to clients from a particular neighborhood, 
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especially in those communities where neighborhood boundaries are strong 
and public transportation into neighborhoods is weak.  How we make these 
decisions may predetermine who our clients are, and who our clients are may 
predetermine the issues we address. 
What does all of this mean?  Basically, the notion of serving a class as 
broad as “the homeless” involves defining the class.  At some level this is not a 
very fruitful task.  It may be more useful to think in terms of the community 
we choose to represent.  With the homeless, the problem is complicated in that 
homeless people do not constitute a community in the traditional sense or, for 
that matter, even an interest group with a common theme. 
To work toward an effective definition of community, we need to start 
with a few assumptions about our own community, i.e. the legal community.  
First, there are no real generalists.  I assume that there is no lawyer who can 
competently represent clients in cases or projects including the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit, mixed-income housing financing, supportive housing, 
public housing, social security disability, SSI, veterans rights, relocation 
benefits, mental health issues, evictions, welfare, worker’s compensation, 
unemployment compensation, medical benefits, civil commitment, dependent 
and neglected children, criminal law, torts, probate law, and the various other 
areas in which homeless people need representation.  No one does everything. 
That said, it is useful (and perhaps critical) to develop a framework within 
which we expect to provide services.  One place to start is to ask whether we 
see homelessness as a supply side or demand side problem.  Do we perceive 
the solution to homelessness (or at least our own goals) as providing more 
housing or providing services directly to homeless people.  I start with this 
distinction because I believe there is a fundamental difference between 
developing housing and providing individualized legal services.  Housing 
development is usually on behalf of an institution or corporation and includes 
an aspect of community support (or, more frequently, community opposition), 
as well as market issues.  Is your community more like Detroit (a city 
government supportive of housing development, with available subsidies and 
cheap space), New Haven (over 33% of current housing is currently 
subsidized, with little available space for development and a strong consensus 
for increasing home ownership), or suburban and exurban communities 
(available green space, but strong community opposition to any affordable 
housing)? 
This initial assessment will inform the type of service we provide by 
limiting the type or amount of housing that can be developed.  In making this 
assessment, it is critical that we inform ourselves as to community partners.  
Are there groups in the community seeking to build supportive housing, 
transitional housing, efficiencies, affordable housing, group homes, congregate 
housing or any other possible combinations to meet the needs of the homeless 
population?  What kind of assistance do these groups need?  Are there people 
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who want to form groups but need assistance with incorporation or tax 
exemption?  Unless we understand the needs of our communities, we cannot 
begin to make community-based decisions in developing housing. 
The analysis is no less exacting for those providing individualized services, 
sometimes referred to as the “service model.”  As Gerald Lopez noted in 
Rebellious Lawyering, too many lawyers equate what they do best with what is 
best for the community.3  When dealing with scarce resources, this approach, 
at best, risks a misallocation of resources.  There is a risk, however, of doing 
real harm.  When the only available tool is a hammer, we think that everything 
can be solved by hitting.  While hitting a nail may give the desired result, 
hitting a computer is not likely to be as effective.  The same is true with 
complex community relationships.  An attorney with expertise in defending 
evictions may offer an individualized service that keeps an individual or a 
family in a housing unit for a longer period of time, thus preventing imminent 
homelessness.  That “success” may be on behalf of someone committing a 
serious nuisance, drug dealing or violence.  The successful intervention on 
behalf of the individual can damage the larger community.  We can justify the 
representation on a theory of defending individual rights, but not on a 
community-based approach. 
We often note all of the things that are not rocket science or brain surgery.  
There is a collerary.  Some things are rocket science and others are brain 
surgery.  The workings of a community are complicated.  We are only starting 
to understand the many factors that can tip a neighborhood in regards to race, 
crime and home ownership.  We cite the “broken window syndrome” for the 
proposition that broken windows, uncut grass or other signs of blight can 
spread, causing neighborhood deterioration.  However, we have little 
knowledge as to how many broken windows we need to fix before localized 
improvements begin to spread outward. 
Evicting a problem tenant is an attempt to fix a window.  The eviction 
defense is often like breaking another window.  When we justify the eviction 
defense based on an individual rights commitment, we should understand that 
our representation affects a larger community.  In some cases we will be 
hitting the community with a hammer.  Like the computer, the community will 
not always react well. 
Let me tell one more story about priorities in representing community 
interests.  As Executive Director of a public housing authority, I received a 
notice of a zoning board hearing concerning an application for a variance to 
sell beer in a convenience store adjacent to 175 public housing units.  I planned 
to testify in opposition to the application, as the owner of the adjacent property.  
I made sure that tenants and other governmental officials knew about the 
application and my plans.  In preparation, I reviewed studies that showed a 
 
 3. GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING; ONE CHICANO’S EXPERIENCE 3 (1992). 
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strong correlation between the existence of alcohol outlets and violent assaults, 
particularly the association between youthful violence and the geographic 
availability of alcohol. 
At the hearing, however, my approach changed.  The chairman of the 
zoning board, noting that variances were based on hardship and impediment to 
land use, inquired as to the applicant’s hardship.  The applicant’s attorney 
answered in terms of the inconvenience to neighborhood consumers, who 
would have to travel further (although not that far) in order to buy beer.  He 
presented a petition with over 100 signatures. 
This seemed like a golden opportunity to attack the sufficiency of the 
application and I did so, arguing that, given the lack of a prima facie showing 
of hardship, the zoning board had no authority to grant the application.  As I 
was making the legal argument, however, I found myself saying, “by the way, 
I should note that I am a member of the Connecticut Bar.”  In short, I realized 
that what I was doing was lawyering, which was different than stating my view 
as a public official.  The local alderwoman, a police officer and a tenant leader, 
also testified against the variance. 
Afterwards, I thought about the fact that the tenant leader was not 
represented in what was an important legal proceeding.  Ironically, two days 
earlier I had received a request for information from the local legal services 
program, noting that they represent many public housing tenants, as well as the 
city-wide public housing tenant organization.  While this may be true, I have 
seen no evidence in support of this claim.  Although the Housing Authority is 
the largest landlord in my community, we would rarely know that legal 
services exists if it were not for eviction defenses which, in the overall scheme 
of things, has little institutional effect, other than to delay (but not prevent) a 
few evictions.  This is not a question of bad priorities, it is a question of no 
priorities.  This is not community-based representation and is, in my view, a 
terrible waste of a valuable community resource. 
The failure to set real community-based priorities has a dramatic effect on 
the homeless population. The Housing Authority has completed its 
Comprehensive Plan, as required by HUD.  Our housing stock includes several 
hundred efficiency units, which cannot be effectively marketed to the elderly.  
As I write this, we have more vacant efficiencies than we have elderly people 
on our waiting list.  As we wrestle with issues of allocation of units, not to 
mention demolition or disposition, we are lobbied by advocates for the elderly, 
disabled, and those needing supportive housing, not to mention legislators and 
other governmental officials.  Because of the lack of any community-based 
outreach, the homeless go unrepresented, except to the extent that they are 
included in a particular supportive housing proposal.  As we concluded eight 
months of planning, with the final report ready for submission to HUD, after 
months of meeting with unrepresented tenants, we did not receive any inquiries 
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or demands from any lawyer, other than requests for information from legal 
services. 
Elsewhere, Raymond Brecia, Robin Golden, and I discussed the 
importance of identifying a “community voice” through developing 
relationships with community leaders and legitimate neighborhood based 
institutions.4  Community institutions are critical in helping to inform us of 
community needs, including the legal needs of individuals within the 
community.  Of course, it is one thing to define a “legitimate community-based 
organization” and another to find one, particularly when there are competing 
organizations claiming legitimacy.  Still, homeless resource centers, shelters, 
and the streets are excellent places to meet with homeless people and identify 
their needs.  Non-profit service providers and unincorporated groups are often 
desperate for representation. 
In addition to meeting specific legal needs of the groups, however, 
members of the groups will identify individual needs (whether you want them 
to or not).  That is the nature of working with groups whose individual 
members cannot afford private attorneys.  Structuring individual representation 
within group goals also fosters a fuller discussion of how individual problems 
support or conflict with those goals.  Conflicts between individual problems 
and group goals may lead to a reassessment of group interests or, at least, a 
clearer enunciation.  That is not to say that the group should influence the 
lawyer’s actions concerning an individual client once the lawyer has agreed to 
represent that client.  Such influence would raise ethical problems.5  Nothing 
prevents an attorney, however, from refusing to accept an individual case 
because it conflicts with group goals. 
Ultimately, a community-based process requires identifying the 
community and setting priorities.  If those priorities are set in a law office by 
lawyers, informed predominantly by those who manage to get to the law 
office, the priorities are unlikely to be representative of the community at 
large.  Real priority setting must involve a client base and must occur on the 
clients’ turf. 
 
 4. R. Brecia, R. Golden & R. Solomon, Who’s In Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for 
Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 856-860 (1998). 
 5. See, e.g., Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13, Organization as a Client, 
which permits representing an organization and its constituents, subject to Rule 1.7, Conflict of 
Interest.  See also Rule 5.4, Professional Independence of a Lawyer, particularly Rule 5.4(c).  The 
Connecticut Rules are virtually identical to the Model Rules. 
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